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Abstract
In this note we investigate the relation between a Cournot equilib-
rium and aBertrand equilibrium in a duopoly with differentiated goods
in which each firmmaximizes its relative profit that is the difference be-
tween its profit and the profit of the rival firm. We will show that when
firms maximize relative profits, a Cournot equilibrium and a Bertrand
equilibrium coincide, and the equilibrium outputs under relative max-
imization is larger than both of the equilibrium outputs at the Cournot
equilibrium and the Bertrand equilibrium under absolute profit maxi-
mization. We assume that demand functions for the goods of the firms




In this note we investigate the relation between a Cournot equilibrium
and a Bertrand equilibrium in a duopoly with differentiated substitutable
goods in which each firm maximizes its relative profit that is the difference
between its profit and the profit of the rival firm. We show that when firms
maximize relative profits, a Cournot equilibrium and a Bertrand equilibrium
coincide, and the equilibrium outputs under relative profit maximization are
larger than the equilibrium outputs at the Cournot equilibrium and those at
the Bertrand equilibrium under absolute profit maximization. We assume
that demand functions for the goods of the firms are linear, the marginal
costs of the firms are common and constant and the fixed costs are zero.
In recent years, maximizing relative profit instead of absolute profit has
aroused the interest of economists. Froman evolutionary perspective, Schaf-
fer(1989) demonstrates with a Darwinian model of economic natural selec-
tion that if firms have market power, profit-maximizers are not necessarily
the best survivors. According to Schaffer(1989), a unilateral deviation from
Cournot equilibrium decreases the profit of the deviator, but decreases the
other firm’s profit even more. On the condition of being better than other
competitors, firms that deviate from Cournot equilibrium achieve higher
payoffs than the payoffs they receive under Cournot equilibrium. In Vega-
Redondo(1997), it is argued that, under a general equilibrium framework, if
firms maximize relative profit, a Walrasian equilibrium can be induced.
On the other hand, Lundgren(1996) shows that by making managerial
compensation depend on relative profits rather than absolute profits, the in-
centives for oligopoly collusion can be eliminated. Kockesen et. al.(2000)
have shown that under some conditions a firm which strives to maximize rel-
ative profit will outperform a firm which maximizes absolute profit. Bolton
and Ockenfels(2000) and Fehr and Schmidt(1999) conducted an analysis
considering an individual utility function that brings about a feeling of com-
passion toward an individual with a relatively lower material payoff and si-
multaneously brings about envy of other individuals with a higher material
payoff.
2. The model
There are two firms, A and B. They produce differentiated substitutable
goods. Notations are as follows.
Output of Firm A 𝑥𝐴
Output of Firm B 𝑥𝐵
Price of the good of Firm A 𝑝𝐴
Price of the good of Firm B 𝑝𝐵
The marginal costs of the firms are common, and equal 𝑐 > 0. There is
no fixed cost.
The inverse demand functions of the goods produced by the firms are
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝑥𝐵,
and
𝑝𝐵 = 𝑎 − 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴,
where 𝑎 > 𝑐 and 0 < 𝑏 < 1. 𝑥𝐴 represents the demand for the good of Firm
A, and 𝑥𝐵 represents the demand for the good of Firm B. The prices of the
goods are determined so that demand of consumers for each firm's good and
supply of each firm are equilibrated.
The ordinary demand functions for the goods of the firms are obtained
from those inverse demand functions as follows,
𝑥𝐴 =
1




1 − 𝑏2 [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝑏𝑝𝐴].
3. Absolute profit maximization
3.1 Cournot equilibrium
The profits of Firm A and B are written as
𝜋𝐴 = (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝑥𝐵)𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐𝑥𝐴,
and
𝜋𝐵 = (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴)𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐𝑥𝐵.
Each firm determines its output given the output of the rival firm so as
to maximize its (absolute) profit. The conditions for profit maximization of
the firms are
𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐 = 0,
and
𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐 = 0.
From these conditions the equilibrium outputs of the firms are obtained as
follows,
𝑥𝐶𝐴 = 𝑥𝐶𝐵 =
𝑎 − 𝑐
2 + 𝑏.
The equilibrium prices of the goods of the firms are as follows,
𝑝𝐶𝐴 = 𝑝𝐶𝐵 =
𝑎 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐
2 + 𝑏
3.2 Bertrand equilibrium
The profits of Firm A and B are written as
𝜋𝐴 =
1




1 − 𝑏2 [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝑏𝑝𝐴](𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐).
Each firm determines the price of its good given the price of the rival
firm's good so as to maximize its (absolute) profit. The conditions for profit
maximization of the firms are
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 2𝑝𝐴 + 𝑏𝑝𝐵 + 𝑐 = 0,
and
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 2𝑝𝐵 + 𝑏𝑝𝐴 + 𝑐 = 0.
From these conditions the equilibrium prices of the goods of the firms are
obtained as follows,
𝑝𝐵𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵𝐵 =
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 + 𝑐
2 − 𝑏 .
The equilibrium outputs of the firms are as follows,
𝑥𝐵𝐴 = 𝑥𝐵𝐵 =
𝑎 − 𝑐
(1 + 𝑏)(2 − 𝑏)
4. Relative profit maximization
4.1 Cournot equilibrium
The relative profit of Firm A (or B) is the difference between its profit
and the profit of Firm B (or A). We denote the relative profit of Firm A by
Π𝐴 and that of Firm B by Π𝐵. They are written as follows,
Π𝐴 =𝜋𝐴 − 𝜋𝐵 = (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝑥𝐵)𝑥𝐴 − (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴)𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐(𝑥𝐴 − 𝑥𝐵)
=(𝑎 − 𝑐)(𝑥𝐴 − 𝑥𝐵) − 𝑥2𝐴 + 𝑥2𝐵,
and
Π𝐵 =𝜋𝐵 − 𝜋𝐴 = (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴)𝑥𝐵 − (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝑥𝐵)𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐(𝑥𝐵 − 𝑥𝐴)
=(𝑎 − 𝑐)(𝑥𝐵 − 𝑥𝐴) − 𝑥2𝐵 + 𝑥2𝐴,
Each firm determines its output given the output of the rival firm so as to
maximize its relative profit. Thus, Firm A determines 𝑥𝐴 so as to maximize
Π𝐴. The condition for relative profit maximization of Firm A is
𝑎 − 𝑐 − 2𝑥𝐴 = 0.
And the condition for relative profit maximization of Firm B is
𝑎 − 𝑐 − 2𝑥𝐵 = 0.
Thus, the equilibrium outputs of the firms are
?̃?𝐶𝐴 = ?̃?𝐶𝐵 =
𝑎 − 𝑐
2 .
The equilibrium prices of the goods of the firms are derived as follows,
̃𝑝𝐶𝐴 = ̃𝑝𝐶𝐵 =
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐
2 .
4.2 Bertrand equilibrium
Similarly to the previous subsection the relative profits of Firm A and B
are denoted by Π𝐴 and Π𝐵. They are written as follows,
Π𝐴 =𝜋𝐴 − 𝜋𝐵
= 11 − 𝑏2 [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎(𝑝𝐴 − 𝑝𝐵) − 𝑝
2
𝐴 + 𝑝2𝐵 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐(𝑝𝐴 − 𝑝𝐵)],
and
Π𝐵 =𝜋𝐵 − 𝜋𝐴
= 11 − 𝑏2 [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎(𝑝𝐵 − 𝑝𝐴) − 𝑝
2
𝐵 + 𝑝2𝐴 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐(𝑝𝐵 − 𝑝𝐴)],
Each firm determines the price of its good given the price of the rival
firm's good so as to maximize its relative profit. Thus, Firm A determines
𝑝𝐴 so as to maximize Π𝐴. The condition for relative profit maximization of
Firm A is
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 2𝑝𝐴 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐 = 0.
And the condition for relative profit maximization of Firm B is
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 2𝑝𝐵 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐 = 0.
Thus, the equilibrium prices of the goods of the firms are
̃𝑝𝐵𝐴 = ̃𝑝𝐵𝐵 =
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐
2 .
The equilibrium outputs of the firms are obtained as follows,
?̃?𝐵𝐴 = ?̃?𝐵𝐵 =
𝑎 − 𝑐
2
Since 0 < 𝑏 < 1 we can show
?̃?𝐶𝐴 = ?̃?𝐵𝐴 > 𝑥𝐶𝐴 > 𝑥𝐵𝐴.
5. Conclusion and future research plans
From the results of the previous sections we get the following conclusion.
In a duopoly with differentiated substitutable goods the equi-
librium outputs at the Cournot equilibrium under relative profit
maximization, ?̃?𝐶𝐴 and ?̃?𝐶𝐵 , and the equilibriumoutputs at theBertrand
equilibrium under relative profit maximization, ?̃?𝐵𝐴 and ?̃?𝐵𝐵, are
equal.
Therefore, the equilibrium prices at the Cournot equilibrium un-
der relative profit maximization, ̃𝑝𝐶𝐴 and ̃𝑝𝐶𝐵 , and the equilibrium
prices at the Bertrand equilibrium under relative profit maxi-
mization, ̃𝑝𝐵𝐴 and ̃𝑝𝐵𝐵, are also equal.
The equilibrium outputs under relative profit maximization are
larger than the equilibrium outputs at the Cournot equilibrium
and those at Bertrand equilibrium under absolute profit maxi-
mization
We plan to research the various themes about relative profit maximiza-
tion under imperfect competition. Especially;
1. The relation between Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly
or oligopoly under relative profit maximization with general demand
functions.
2. Stackelberg equilibrium in a duopoly under relative profit maximiza-
tion with Cournot behavior or Bertrand behavior.
3. The effects of trade policies such as tariffs and export subsidies in a
duopoly or oligopoly under relative profitmaximizationwith segmented
markets and integrated markets.
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